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W h a t  m u s t  t h e y  b e  a b l e  t o  d o ,  w h a t  t r a i t s  o r  
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  m u s t  t h e y  s h o w ,  t o  g a i n  s e r i o u s  
a t t e n t i o n :  I s  s e n t i e n c e  e n o u g h ?  W i l l  d e m o n s t r a t e d  
e m o t i o n s  s u f f i c e ?  O r  d o  w e  d e m a n d  t h a t ,  i n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e y  d i s p l a y  c o g n i t i v e  s k i l l s ,  i n c l u d i n g  a n  a b i l i t y  t o  
" l e a r n  o u r  l a n g u a g e "  - p r e f e r a b l y ,  o n e  o f  t h e  
f o r m a l i z e d  s y m b o l i c  l a n g u a g e s  s c i e n t i s t s  u s e  t o  t e s t  
t h e m ?  
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o n  r a t i o n a l i s t i c  m o d e s  o f  p e r c e p t i o n  a n d  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  m a y  m a k e  i t  h a r d ,  i f  n o t  i m p o s s i b l e ,  
t o  r e s i s t  a s s e s s i n g  o t h e r  c r e a t u r e s '  w o r t h  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
t h e i r  S C i e n t i f i c a l l y  p r o c l a i m e d  a b i l i t y  t o  
" i n t e l l e c t u a l i z e , "  t o  t h i n k  a b s t r a c t l y .  W i t h o u t  b e i n g  
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fully aware we may anxiously scan our companion 
animals for signs of cognition, consciously or 
subconsciously disturbed over whether our cat or dog 
is "really smart," and not merely acting by "instinct." 
For, have we not heard that pigs are smarter than 
dogs? Some say that cetaceans are smarter than 
humans. Chimpanzees, reputedly our closest 
nonhuman relatives, have shown definite signs of 
thinking the way we do; automatically their value 
appreciates. The proof comes when authority figures, 
like Carl Sagan, start raising questions. Impressed by 
the chimpanzee's ability to use Ameslan (American 
sign language) and to invent strategies for outwitting 
chickens, Sagan asks: "If chimpanzees have 
consciousness, if they are capable of abstractions, do 
they not have what until now has been described as 
'human rights'?" (Carl Sagan, ''lbe Abstractions of 
Beasts," from The Dragons of Eden: Speculations on 
the Evolution of Human Intelligence). 
Concerning Ameslan, it should be borne in mind 
that the chimpanzee's ability to exercise this 
language depends on an anatomical feature that 
resembles one of ours - manual dexterity. Thus, no 
matter how unique or intelligent, or how willing, any 
creature having paws, fins, hoofs, or claws cannot 
learn to use (even if capable of understanding) 
Ameslan. Similarly, chimpanzees, though not 
"dumb," appear to be physiologically and 
anatomically ill-adapted to using (however 
competent of understanding) verbal language, which 
is why researchers switched to Ameslan. What 
happens, though, to animals who for one reason or 
other cannot, or will not, communicate in our terms? 
Whose kind of intelligence is not our kind? Whose 
modes of experience elude us? Must the "illiterate" 
animal forgo "human rights"? 
The problem of speciesism crops up. The film 
Project X offers a case in point. While stressing the 
chimpanzee's ability to learn Ameslan, it also asks 
viewers to pay attention to the wealth of nonverbal 
communication and expressiveness in human as well 
as nonhuman animals. A bond of fellowship, even of 
friendship, might be forged here. But the film's 
reliance on humanosemblance to help carry this 
message across could have a contrary effect. 
Audiences are apt to be narcissistically gratified, and 
relieved of guilt, at seeing a chimp who not only 
implements a language that we have invented and 
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imposed, but who seems to want to transcend his 
chimpanzee nature, to fly like a bird or better yet fly 
a plane. At such moments the empathic flow levels 
out to just another space trip, another ego trip. 
Ecologists have criticized the animal rights 
community for extending the boundaries of ethical 
concern only as far as the human ego is willing to 
travel. Some of us draw the line at oysters, 
others...Well, beyond whatever line we draw lies an 
enormous wasteland of foregone conclusions. 
"Intellectualizing" the wasteland is one solution. 
Making it over into Fantasyland, into Frontierland, 
is another. Animal people need to be on the lookout 
- the Disneyfication of the Desert syndrome should 
signal to us a warning. Anxious not to alienate 
others from our cause, half doubtful of our own 
minds at times in a world which views other animals 
so much differently than we do, we are liable to find 
ourselves presenting them apologetically at Court, 
spiffed up to seem more human, capable, ladies and 
gentlemen, of performing Ameslan in six 
languages... 
For whatever reasons we may be tempted to do 
this, the fact remains: other animals, regardless of 
how close to us, are not humanoids. They are not 
phylogenetic fetuses that await our stimulating 
contact to develop their evolutionary potential, any 
more than they are failed humans, a kind of vast 
inferno population whose only hope is genetic 
redemption through our engineers. To cast them in 
either of these make-believe roles, to approach them 
as foregone conclusions, is to miss seeing them, and 
in doing so, to create blindedness in ourselves and in 
others. 
To avoid contributing to the very attitudes 
towards other living beings that we seek to change, 
we have to raise fundamental questions about the 
way that we, the defenders of animals, actually 
conceive of them. What must a creature do in order 
to secure the affection, the compassion, the justice 
and protection that we humans crave for ourselves? 
Are we willing to allow other living beings the right 
to travel on their road, even when it branches off 
from ours? Is not our willingness to do this what 
animal liberation, for them and for us, is all about? 
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